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The increasing costs and frequency of security incidents require organizations to apply proper IT risk management. At the 
same time, the expanding usage of Service-oriented Architectures fosters software systems composed of cross-linked 
services. Therefore, it is important to develop risk management methods for these composite systems. In this paper, we 
present a straightforward model that can be used to quantify the risks related to service networks. Based on the probability 
distribution of the costs which are related to risks, it is possible to make proper investment choices using individual risk 
preferences. The attractiveness of investment alternatives and different levels of security can be measured with various 
characteristics like the expected value of the costs, the Value-at-Risk or more complex utility functions. Through 
performance evaluations we show that our model can be used to calculate the costs’ probability density function for large 
scale networks in a very efficient way. Furthermore, we demonstrate the application of the model and the algorithms with the 
help of a concrete application scenario. As a result, we improve IT risk management by proposing a model which supports 
decision makers in comparing alternative service scenarios and alternative security investments in order to find the optimal 
level of IT security. 
Keywords 
Risk management, risk quantification, composed services, security and privacy, investment decisions, risk preferences. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the frequency of security incidents (Richardson, 2009) as well as the total cost of a data breaches (Ponemon, 
2009), e.g., the loss or theft of personal information, increased. Therefore, organizations are required to apply proper IT risk 
management. 
At the same time, the expanding usage of Service-oriented Architectures (SOA) fosters software systems that can be built and 
consist of hundreds or thousands of cross-linked services. Business processes – following the SOA paradigm – can be 
composed of services, which deliver defined business functionality and are clearly encapsulated and loosely coupled entities 
(Papazoglou and Heuvel, 2007). Companies utilize these service networks to map their composite, digital business processes. 
Therefore, it is important to develop risk management methods for composite systems, especially since some of the services 
might be outsourced to third party organizations, which can be distributed all over the world. The integration of external 
services into service-based software systems is a value potential as it supports the services' consumers to create new 
functionality, increase quality or to perform the processes at lower costs (Becker, Buxmann and Widjaja, 2009). 
Commercial organizations have to assess the effective level of security and the optimal usage of security measures. Before 
setting up security measures, commercial organizations have to decide between different, alternative security investments. As 
budget constraints are one of the major concerns to effective information security (van Kessel, 2009), this decision is related 
to the measures' cost-benefit trade-off. If a decision maker can estimate the occurrence probabilities and costs associated with 
the risks related to an investment, it is possible to make proper investment choices using individual risk preferences based on 
the probability density function of the arising costs. The attractiveness of investment alternatives and different levels of 
security can be measured with various characteristics like the costs’ expected value, the Value-at-Risk (Jorion, 1997) or more 
complex utility functions like the µ-σ-rule. 
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To our knowledge, no research has been done that proposed risk quantification methods for making IT security investment 
decisions in the context of service networks. Moreover, current risk models do not incorporate the fact that there may be risks 
in services and between services (i.e. data transfers). 
This paper addresses the following two research questions: a) How can the risks related to large-scale service networks 
practicably be quantified? b) Can these quantifications be used to make proper investment choices based on individual risk 
preferences? 
Answering those research questions has various implications for IT risk management in the context of service networks, 
especially for the phase of risk quantification. Once related risks have been identified, their potential severity of loss and the 
probability of occurrence have to be assessed. As a first step, it is possible to assess one concrete scenario based on the 
probability distribution of the losses that could arise if some risks occur. Building on that, multiple alternative scenarios can 
be compared by performing the calculations with different individual parameters. Furthermore, it is possible to perform the 
task of service selection where a decision maker can choose among candidates for some or all services. This could be done by 
calculating the attractiveness for each combination of candidates and selecting the combination with the highest assessment. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, this paper gives a brief overview of the related work in Section 2. 
In Section 3, we present a straightforward model that can be used to quantify the risks related to service networks and show 
performance evaluations. Section 4 demonstrates the model’s application using an existing research project scenario in which 
two alternative security investments are compared. The limitations of our results are discussed in Section 5, and in the last 
Section we conclude and list avenues for further research. 
 
RELATED WORK 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the risks related to IT outsourcing (ITO) and classifications for 
related risks and challenges are discussed in various publications. 
Earl discusses risks of traditional ITO, like the possibility of hidden costs, business uncertainty, outdated technology skills, 
loss of innovative capacity, and technology indivisibility (Earl, 1996). Comprehensive reviews of literature on ITO are 
published by Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka, 2004 as well as Willcocks, Lacity and Cullen, 2007. A review of 
the ITO and Application Service Provision (ASP) literature is given by Lacity et al. They reviewed 34 published papers on 
ITO risks and risk management and list the 28 commonly mentioned risks (Lacity, Khan and Willcocks, 2009). Major risks 
are contract, security, or privacy breaches by the vendor, poor capability or service, lack of trust, and vendor lock-in due to 
high switching costs. Methods for ASP risk mitigation are presented in Kern, Willcocks and Lacity, 2002. Mullender 
discusses the risks of distributed systems, consisting of processing elements and the communication networks, which can 
both fail or be attacked. The overall, distributed system offers more possibilities of interference, compared to in-house 
systems with their smaller attack surface. The failure of a single, central service might lead to the whole system’s breakdown 
(Mullender, 1993). More recent publications address business-oriented and service-specific threats in the context of the 
Internet of Services in which characteristics, such as loose coupling, composability and intermediary market places, are 
exploited (Miede, Ackermann, Repp, Abawi, Steinmetz and Buxmann, 2010). 
 
IT risk quantification methods in the form of metrics and risk measures for IT security have been examined only recently. 
The return on security investment (ROSI) is derived from the classic return on investment (ROI) which represents the 
financial gain of a project in relation to its total cost. ROSI measures the effect of risk mitigation in relation to a security 
measure’s costs (Sonnenreich, Albanese and Stout, 2006). Pinto et al. use a risk-based ROI which distinguishes between 
incident types and incorporates bypass rates to determine costs and benefits of security solutions (Pinto, Arora, Hall and 
Schmitz, 2006). For a number of particular risks, formulas have been proposed to quantify the related losses. Patterson 
presents a formula for the estimated average cost of one hour of server downtime (Patterson, 2002). Dübendorfer et al. define 
metrics for large scale Internet attacks, including downtime related loss, the loss due to disaster recovery, and liability cost 
which incur because contracts with third parties cannot be fulfilled and these third parties demand financial compensation 
(Dübendorfer, Wagner and Plattner, 2004). A risk model which is related to service networks is presented by Pang and Whitt. 
They analyze service interruptions in large-scale service systems and quantify the impact of service interruptions with 
increasing scale of the systems (Pang and Whitt, 2009). A survey of economic security metrics is given by Böhme and 
Nowey (Böhme and Nowey, 2008). 
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There is also a body of literature based on more complex quantification approaches regarding IT security investments. These 
publications, however, are not focused on systems composed of services. 
Gordon and Loeb present an economic model which derives an optimal level of information security spending to protect a 
given set of information. Their model incorporates the vulnerability of information to a security breach and the potential 
losses resulting if such breaches occur (Gordon and Loeb, 2002). Soo Hoo proposes a modeling approach that involves 
uncertain bad events causing losses and security countermeasures. He uses a decision analysis approach to evaluate a set of 
different levels of information security (Soo Hoo, 2000). Dutta and Roy developed a system dynamics model of the interplay 
between technical and behavioral security factors. They study the patterns in the value of an organization’s IT over time in 
order to quantify the impact of security mechanisms. Based on stock-flow models for the user reaction sector as well as the 
organizational reactions associated with information security, they analyze responses to standard input test patterns. (Dutta 
and Roy, 2008). A game theory model is presented by Cavusoglu et al. (Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan, 2004b). The 
model can be used to find the most cost effective configuration for intrusion detection systems based on the probability of 
intrusions and the costs occurring each time the organization manually monitors the audit trail for a possible intrusion. The 
application of real options techniques to information security is shown by Herath and Herath. They propose a model which 
incorporates active learning and postauditing and can be used for the assessment of the value of information security assets 
and for the evaluation of investment decisions (Herath and Herath, 2008). Wang et al. introduce the concept of Value-at-Risk 
in order to measure the stochastic behavior of daily losses due to security exploits. By using a Value-at-Risk approach they 
consider extremal yet perhaps relatively rare incidents and allow decision makers to make investment choices based on their 
own risk preference (Wang, Chaudhury and Rao, 2008). 
 
MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This section introduces the model’s parameters and presents two algorithms which can be used to quantify the risks related to 
service networks. 
Table 1 lists the notations that we will use in the following discussion. Let n
S
 denote the number of services in the service-
graph. They are represented by the graph’s nodes. Each edge symbolizes a data transfer between two services. In total, the 
graph consists of n
T
 data transfers. Figure 1 shows an example of such a graph with n
S
 = 8 and n
T
 = 10. 
 
 
Figure 1. Exemplary Services Call Graph 
 
The invocation of services is associated with service-related risks. p
S
ij denotes the occurrence probability of service-related 
risk i in service j. An incident of service-related risk i (occurring in one or more of the service calls) causes costs of c
S
i. 
Additionally, every data transfer between two services is associated with data transfer-related risks with occurrence 
probability p
T
ij and caused costs of c
T




 service-related risks and r
T
 data transfer-related risks. 
The model is based on the assumption that all risks are uncorrelated with each other. We also modeled the costs to be 
independent of the service or data transfer. If a security breach occurs and personal data are eavesdropped, costs arise without 
regard to the service where the data leaked. Additionally, it is possible to map individual costs or risks that can only occur in 
one place, by adding a new risk for each service or data transfer where the costs differ, and setting the other occurrence 
probabilities to zero. 
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 The number of services in the graph (nodes) 
n
T
 The number of data transfers in the graph (edges) 
r
S
 The number of service-related risks 
r
T
 The number of data transfer-related risks 
r
A









ij The occurrence probability of service-related risk i in service j 
p
T
ij The occurrence probability of data transfer-related risk i in data transfer j 
p
A
i The combined and aggregated occurrence probability of risk i 
c
S
i The costs associated with service-related risk i 
c
T
i The costs associated with data transfer-related risk i 
c
A
i The combined costs associated with risk i 
E(C) The expected values for the occurring costs 
CPD The probability density function of the costs 
Table 1. Notations 
 
For risk-neutral decision makers, the expected value for the occurring costs can be calculated using (1): 
 
 
The first part of (1) aggregates the service-related risks, while the second part aggregates all data transfer-related risks. Each 
outer sum iterates over all risks and for each risk, the occurrence probability is calculated in the square brackets and 
multiplied by the costs related to the risk. The occurrence probability is derived by calculating the probability for the event 
that the risk does not arise in any service or data transfer and using the complementary probability. 
 
In order to shorten the algorithms, we use a condensed notation that treats service-related and data transfer-related risks the 
same. Therefore, c
A






. The values for p
A
i 
are calculated using the part in the square brackets of (1): 
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The following algorithm describes how the costs’ probability density function CPD can be calculated based on p
A
i  and c
A
i : 
Algorithm 1: Calculation of the Cost’s Probability Density Function 
 
The algorithm iterates over all possible combinations of risks that could occur simultaneously (line 1). For each combination 
the probability and the arising costs are calculated (lines 4 to 11) and added to the probability density function of the costs 
CPD (lines 12 to 16) which maps costs to their occurrence probability. 
The power set  containing all subsets of the set { j  ℕ | 1 ≤ j ≤ rA } in line 1 can be implemented efficiently by iterating 
over all integers from zero to two to the r
A 
th power minus one and looking at each integer’s bit-representation in line 5. If the 
bit at position i equals one, we use the branch “i  subset”. 
The Value-at-Risk for a given confidence level α and the probability density function CPD is the level of loss that will not be 
exceeded with a given probability of error. It is defined as the lowest number l, so that the probability that losses L greater 
than l occur, is exceeded by (1 - α) (Duffie and Pan, 1997). The Value-at-Risk can be calculated using the following 
algorithm: 
Algorithm 2. Calculation of the Value-at-Risk 
 






i   i  { j  ℕ | 1 ≤ j ≤ r
A
 } 
  output The calculated probability density function of the costs CPD 
 1: for all subset  ({ j  ℕ | 1 ≤ j ≤ rA }) do 
 2:  costs ← 0.0 
 3:  probability ← 1.0 
 4:  for i ← 1 to r
A
 do 
 5:   if i  subset then 
 6:    costs ← costs + c
A
i  
 7:    probability ← probability · p
A
i  
 8:   else 
 9:    probability ← probability · (1.0 - p
A
i ) 
 10:   end if 
 11:  end for 
 12:  if  CPD[costs] then 
 13:   CPD[costs] ← CPD[costs] + probability 
 14:  else 
 15:   CPD[costs] ← probability 
 16:  end if 
 17: end for 
 18: return CPD 
 
  input  Confidence level α  { r  ℝ | 0 < r ≤ 1 }; CPD 
  output  The calculated Value-at-Risk 
 1:  threshold ← 1.0 - α 
 2: pSum ← 1.0 
 3: for all k  sort ( keys ( CPD ) ) 
 4:  pSum ← pSum - CPD[k] 
 5:  if pSum ≤ threshold then 
 6:   return k 
 7:  end if 
 8: end for 
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The algorithm iterates over the distribution of costs from low to high cost key-values and subtracts all probabilities from 1.0 
until the threshold, defined by the given confidence level α, for the Value-at-Risk is reached. 
In order to evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we measured the time it took to calculate the costs’ probability density 
function for 1,000 randomly generated scenarios. We varied the total number of risks r
A
 from seven to 22. For each r
A
, we 
tested the algorithm with graphs of different sizes by varying the number of services n
S







  { 10
i
 | 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 }. 
Figure 2 shows that the time it takes to calculate the probability density function for the costs does only linearly depend on 
the number of services but exponentially on the total number of risks. This means that the algorithm scales well with large 
networks with over one million services and data transfers. For 20 or more risks, the number of services' influence on the 
solving time even becomes insignificant. However, for graphs with many risks, the presented algorithm should not be used as 
the runtime doubles for every added risk. 
 
 




This section contains the scenario illustration, the description of the identified major risks, and the results of our model’s 
application. 
The scenario which we use to demonstrate our model’s applicability is based on the PREMIUM-Services research project
1
, 
more precisely on the described functionality of the Dynamic Posted Pricing (DPP) service. The project aims to develop a 
service which is offered to online vendors and which can be integrated into their shops. Based on various influencing factors, 
like a product’s durability or a customer’s creditworthiness, the DPP service calculates the most efficient individual price for 
a product that a customer shows interest in. After login, a customer visits a vendor’s web page containing products. The most 
efficient price for some of these products can be calculated by the DPP service and is displayed to the customer as a part of 
an individual product page within the online shop. In the following, we describe details of the scenario whose corresponding 
services call graph is shown in Figure 3. 
                                                          
1
 http://premium-services.de/ 
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1. The online shop’s pricing (OSP) service determines the most efficient price using the DPP service. This price 
depends on different factors, like the customer’s location and creditworthiness, and the demand for the product. As a 
consequence, the online shop transmits information about the product, e.g., past prices, as well as customer data, and 
the customer’s IP address. 
2. The DPP service tries to retrieve the customer’s location and therefore sends the corresponding IP address to the 
Customer Location (CL) service. 
3. The CL service returns data about the customer’s location, like the names of the country, region, and city, or 
approximated geographical coordinates. 
4. The DPP service checks the risk of credit loss using the Customer Rating (CR) service. The transmitted data contain 
information about the customer, like first name, family name, and address. 
5. The CR service returns the risk of credit loss associated with the customer in form of a rating. 
6. The DPP service calculates the most efficient individual price and sends it back to the online shop. 
 
 
Figure 3. Dynamic Posted Pricing Services Scenario 
 
We compare two alternative levels of security for the given scenario, i.e., security at the transport layer and security at the 
application layer. 
For the first security level, we assume that all data are transferred encrypted using the SSL protocol. As SSL technology is 
the de facto standard for secure data transmissions and can easily be applied and largely reduces the risks of eavesdropping 
and manipulation, we do not consider less secure mechanisms. However, SSL solely provides security at the transport layer 
and does not ensure confidentiality or integrity at application layer. Every service receives and processes unencrypted data 
and therefore service-related risks can occur with a higher probability. 
The second security level provides a higher level of security by applying end-to-end security mechanisms at the application 
layer. Customer data, like the name, address, and IP address, are encrypted by the online shop for the CL and CR services 
and cannot be read by the DPP service. The DPP service only forwards the encrypted data to the appropriate services which 
are able to decrypt the information. Therefore, the DPP service does not learn the user’s data. 
In the following, we present our model parameters for the occurrence probabilities and costs. Our estimations are based on 
recent security papers, reports and surveys (e.g., Richardson, 2009; Ponemon, 2009; van Kessel, 2009; Patterson, 2002; 
Campbell, Gordon, Loeb and Zhou, 2003; Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan, 2004a). Note that these estimations serve for 
demonstration purposes only. As we deal with a fictional online shop and new services, no historical data is available from 
which we could extract the parameters like, e.g., Wang et al., 2008 did. 
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We determined lock-in effects (R
S
1), performance problems (R
S
2), profile generation (R
S
3), and relay of information (R
S
4) as the 
four major service-related risks. Table 2 shows the model’s parameter values for the different levels of security. The values 




ij OSP DPP CL CR c
S
i 
 Security Level 1 
R
S
1 0.0 0.4 0.08 0.2 150 
R
S
2 0.08 0.2 0.08 0.4 40 
R
S
3 0.0 0.2 0.08 0.08 60 
R
S
4 0.0 0.2 0.08 0.2 170 
 Security Level 2 
R
S
1 0.0 0.5 0.18 0.3 150 
R
S
2 0.18 0.2 0.18 0.5 40 
R
S
3 0.0 0.002 0.08 0.08 60 
R
S
4 0.0 0.002 0.08 0.2 170 
Table 2. Service-related Risks 
 
1. RS1: The usage of external services that are not provided by multiple providers creates a vendor lock-in effect because 
the service consumers are not able to switch to another equivalent service, and therefore are bound to the only 
existing service provider. If the provider stops the service, there is no fall-back solution for the consumers. The 
probability that lock-in effects occur is the highest for the DPP service, as no comparable services are offered on the 
market, while the probability for the CL is rather low as there are alternative providers available which are able to 
map IP addresses to locations. 
2. RS2: The more complex a service is, the higher is the probability that it may suffer from performance problems or 
may even be completely unavailable. The execution of the CR service and the DPP service involve more processing 




2;4 are higher. 
3. RS3: By surveying the data that are send to and received from the CL and CR services, it could be possible for the 
DPP service’s provider to create detailed profiles of the online shop’s customers. This confidential data could 
contain the customers' identities, addresses, locations, credit ratings and visited product pages. While this surveying 
might be possible for security level 1, it is no longer possible if the online shop uses end-to-end encryption so that 
only the CL and CR services can decrypt and use the data. 
4. RS4: A malicious DPP service could relay confidential customer information to third parties, resulting in high losses 
due to data breaches. We estimate that the loss or theft of personal information could result in the highest total costs 
among our identified major risks. These costs include investigating the breach, notifying customers, restoring 
security infrastructures as well as recovering lost business (Ponemon, 2009; Cavusoglu et al., 2004a). Like R
S
3, this 
risk can be largely reduced for the DPP service by using end-to-end encryption (security level 2). 
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Furthermore, we determined eavesdropping of customer data (R
T
1), manipulation of the credit rating (R
T
2), and manipulation of 
the calculated individual price (R
T
3) as the three major data transfer-related risks. The parameter values for both levels of 




ij DT1 DT2 DT3 DT4 DT5 DT6 c
T
i 
 Security Level 1 
R
T
1 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.0 160 
R
T
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.08 0.0 25 
R
T
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.08 35 
 Security Level 2 
R
T
1 0.0008 0.0016 0.04 0.0032 0.04 0.0 160 
R
T
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.08 0.0 25 
R
T
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.08 35 
Table 3. Data Transfer-related Risks 
 
1. RT1: The major data transfer-related risk is eavesdropping of customer data. Especially the invocations of the DPP or 
the CR service are interesting for attackers because the transmitted data include confidential information like name 
and address. The occurrence probabilities for eavesdropping further decrease when end-to-end encryption is used. 
Therefore, at security level 2, the data transfers 1, 2, and 4 are protected by two security measures: the SSL protocol 
and end-to-end encryption. The risk of eavesdropping is associated with the highest cost of all data transfer-related 
risks because leakage of sensitive customer data might be associated with lost customers, damage to the brand and 
company image, legal cost and penalties as well as employee downtime (Ponemon, 2009; Cavusoglu et al., 2004a). 
2. RT2: Via intelligent manipulation of the customers' credit ratings, it might be possible for an attacker to influence the 
pricing calculations in the DPP service which would result in diverging prices that are displayed to the customers. 
The credit rating is only part of data transfer 5 which does not use additional security at the application layer because 
the DPP service needs to process the data of the CR service in order to calculate the price. Therefore, the occurrence 
probability p
T
2;5 is not influenced by end-to-end encryption. 
3. RT3: Another data transfer-related risk is the manipulation of the calculated individual prices in data transfer 6 which 
is also not end-to-end encrypted as both ends (the DPP and the OSP service) are directly communicating with each 
other. An attacker could return manipulated values to the online shop’s pricing service and thus the online shop 
would present wrong prices to the customer. This could result in losses for the online shop if the manipulated values 
are low or in lost sales because of prices which are too high for the customers. Like R
T
2, this risk cannot be mitigated 
or reduced by using end-to-end encryption. 
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In the following, we present the results of applying our model and algorithms on the described scenario. Figure 4 shows the 
costs’ probability density function and the Values-at-Risk (for α = 0.9) calculated by the presented algorithms for the two 
alternative levels of security. 
 
 
Figure 4. The Costs’ Probability Density Function for the Alternative Security Levels 
 
The distribution for security level 2 shows higher peaks for costs below 200, especially a very high peak at 190 with a 
probability around 25 percent (cropped in Figure 4). The first level of security’s distribution shows visibly higher peaks for 
costs above 360, meaning that the occurrence probability for these greater losses is higher for security level 1. Risk-neutral 
decision makers make their decisions based on the expected value µi of the occurring costs and do not take the amount of 
variation within the costs into account. The first level of security is associated with a higher expected value of µ1 ≈ 241.8. On 
average, in the second security level, costs of µ2 ≈ 208.8 arise. The standard deviation, which may serve as a measure of the 
uncertainty related to an alternative, is slightly higher (σ1 ≈ 136.6) for security level 1, compared to security 
level 2 (σ2 ≈ 114.6). 
The calculated Values-at-Risk for a confidence level of 90 percent are shown in Figure 4. The second level of security has a 
lower Value-at-Risk of 360, while the first security level has a Value-at-Risk of 420. This means that with a probability of 
error of 10 percent, the arising losses will be equal to or lower than 360 or 420. 
 
 
Figure 5. Utility Functions for the Alternative Security Levels 
 
Decision makers who are willing to take risks or who are risk-averse can use more complex utility functions like the µ-σ-rule, 
which calculates the “attractiveness” or utility of an alternative based on the mean value and the distribution’s standard 
deviation. Using the µ-σ-rule, like - Φ (µi, σi) = - µi - α ·σi, the utility function Φ can be adapted to a decision maker’s risk 
preference by varying the parameter α. For negative values of α, the decision maker is willing to take risks, while positive 
values of α represent risk-averse attitudes. Figure 5 shows the utility functions' lines for varying values of the parameter α for 
both levels of security. 
Both lines intercept at α ≈ -1.49 and so two decision makers with risk preferences below and above -1.49 would rate the two 
alternatives differently. For α < -1.49, security level 1 provides a higher utility, while for a decision maker who is less willing 
to take risk with α > -1.49, security level 2 is more favorable. 
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Note that the implementation costs for each of the security levels have to be considered when comparing alternatives as the 
difference in expected losses or utility might not be worth the higher implementation costs. Therefore, our model’s 
application only provides the basis for a concrete decision. If the implementation costs and individual risk preferences are 
neglected, a risk neutral decision maker would choose the second level of security and use end-to-end encryption as it largely 
mitigates risks like profile generation, as well as relay and eavesdropping of information. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the present study. The most important limitation is the fact that the costs 
related to the risks are modeled static, instead of following a distribution function. This simplification has been chosen in 
order to provide an algorithm that can calculate the probability distribution of the arising costs for scenarios containing 
millions of services. 
However, with a small sample size of less than 30 risks, caution must be applied, as the findings might not be transferable if 
more risks have to be considered. Long calculation times can be avoided by using a simulation approach and approximating 
the probability density function. The obtained results will converge to the calculated distributions for a large number of 
iterations. Eventually, it might also be possible to adapt the presented algorithm to not scale exponentially with the number of 
risks. 
The current study has only examined service networks where all model parameters could be provided by the decision maker. 
Therefore, all parameters have to be collected or estimated which is not always easy or feasible. Especially external services, 
provided by third parties, are used like black boxes. Consequently, parameters like the risk probabilities are hard to estimate 
compared to known in-house services. Eventually, the occurrence probability for risks might be higher because of unknown 
sub-contractors and further service calls. 
Especially in IT security with its rapid technological improvements, attacks and security measures change quickly. 
Consequently, the risk occurrence probabilities are dynamic and the model parameters have to be adapted from time to time. 
As historical data of risks and attacks get old, it might be difficult to make prognoses based on it. 
The probability density function of the arising costs must be individually interpreted and so decision makers have to find the 
right characteristics, which represent their risk preferences and utility functions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented a straightforward model which can be used to quantify the risks occurring in systems composed of 
services. Through performance evaluations we showed that our model can be used to mathematically calculate the probability 
density function of the costs for a low number of risks and millions of services and data transfers in a very efficient way. 
Based on the costs’ probability density function, it is possible to make proper investment choices using individual risk 
preferences. The attractiveness of investment alternatives and different levels of security can be measured with various 
characteristics like the expected value of the costs, the Value-at-Risk or more complex utility functions like the µ-σ-rule. 
These characteristics support the decision maker in comparing the risks associated with alternative security investments. 
In addition, we demonstrated the application of the presented model and the algorithms using the existing research project 
scenario of an e-commerce pricing mechanism. We showed that our model and algorithm provide a foundation for comparing 
alternative scenarios and they might be a basis for solving more complex service selection problems. 
Nevertheless, the proposed model is only a first step, and offers various avenues for further research that might extend our 
presented model. Other characteristics of service networks could be incorporated into the model by including the number of 
calls of each service as a new parameter or using conditional branches with transition probabilities. 
Regarding the extraction of the model’s parameters, it would be interesting to assess the automatic extraction of service 
graphs for any given business process (e.g., in the format of a Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) process). This 
would support decision makers because the number of services and data transfers can be extracted from existing service 
graphs and therefore the tables and their columns can be prepared. Another interesting topic for further research is to develop 
methods for identifying the parameters whose change would result in the largest reduction of losses. 
More work will need to be done to determine how the probability and cost parameters can be extracted based on historical 
data sets. 
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